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ABSTRACT
The paradigm of “human computation” seeks to harness human
abilities to solve computational problems or otherwise perform dis-
tributed work that is beyond the scope of current AI technologies.
One aspect of human computation has become known as “games
with a purpose” and seeks to elicit useful computational work in
fun (typically) multi-player games. Human computation also en-
compasses distributed work (or “peer production”) systems such as
Wikipedia and Question and Answer forums. In this short paper,
we survey existing game-theoretic models for various human com-
putation designs, and outline research challenges in advancing a
theory that can enable better design.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, there has been a great deal of progress in
human computation and more speciﬁcally “Games with a Purpose”
(GWAP). As of yet, this ﬁeld has not borrowed much from game
theory and mechanism design, which models the behavior of ra-
tional agents in situations of strategic interdependence and designs
optimal protocols given such a model, respectively. We believe that
game theory has considerable promise in guiding the design of hu-
man computation systems when coupled with an appropriate model
of human motivations. In addition to summarizing some of the ex-
isting game-theoretic models for human computation, our goal in
this paper is to suggest a number of directions for future work.
The role of GWAP is to get humans to do useful work for free,
in tasks that are easy for humans but hard for computers. The ﬁrst
GWAP was the ESP game [26], a two-player game for labeling im-
ages on the web. The development of the ESP game was followed
by the development of Peekaboom [30], a game for locating objects
within an image, Verbosity [29], a game for collecting common
sense facts, and Phetch [28], a game for collecting descriptions for
images on the web. Subsequent work by von Ahn and colleagues
include the development of TagATune [19], a game to gather tags
for music clips, Squigl, a game for gathering segmentation data for
images, and Matchin [9], a game to elicit user preferences. The
design of each of these games shows fantastic imagination and in-
genuity and the success of GWAP such as the ESP game in gen-
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erating useful computational work is impressive. One of the most
important challenges in the design of GWAP is to make them fun to
play. Here, von Ahn and Dabbish [27] describe some features that
have been identiﬁed as salient in this respect, such as time pressure,
a point system and high-score list.
While it seems unlikely that game theory can be used for de novo
design, we do believe that game theory has a role in perturbing de-
signs, and optimizing from within an existing design space. For ex-
ample, we can ask the question: could the equilibrium of a particu-
lar game be improved by small changes to the details of the game?
For example in the ESP game, perhaps it would make sense to try to
leverageanentiresequenceofwordsenteredbybothplayers, rather
than taking the ﬁrst match and discarding all other words [26]? Per-
hapswecouldconsidertakingthe k
th matchforsomek > 1, rather
than introducing “Taboo words,” or otherwise changing the scoring
function? Indeed, we do not currently understand how far from op-
timal each game is, when measured in terms of eliciting the most
efﬁcient work possible while maintaining (or increasing) levels of
participation. For some problems of human computation even sat-
isfactorily formalizing the design objective will be a challenge.
GWAP ﬁt into the larger realm of peer production and systems
to elicit user-generated content. Examples of such systems are
Wikipedia, Question and Answer sites (such as Yahoo! Answers),
and YouTube. In these systems, a distributed user base contributes
to, and gets value from, the system, but generally without any ac-
tual transfer of money. Users may participate in the system for
many different reasons, including recognition, for personal enjoy-
ment, and for the pleasure of working on things that they can do
well [3]. One way in which GWAP differ from other peer produc-
tion systems is that the former seem to more effectively conceal
productive output from users and thus must strive to promote a fun
user experience. With Wikipedia, Question and Answer forums,
and YouTube, the ultimate purpose (e.g. the work) is more obvious
to the user and thus the pleasure of working, contributing, and from
achieving greater visibility can be reward in and of itself. Indeed
with GWAP, it is a challenging task to state what the goal of each
task is in quantiﬁable terms, although this is a necessary task to
assess the optimality of the game design.
In looking to the role of game theory in driving and understand-
ing design decisions, it is instructive to consider a parallel with
the development of peer-to-peer (P2P) ﬁle sharing protocols, which
have beneﬁted from an explicit consideration of incentive proper-
ties. Early P2P protocols suffered from free-riding and it became
necessary to provide incentives for people to upload ﬁles in addi-
tion to downloading them [1]. BitTorrent partially remedied this
problem by introducing a tit-for-tat protocol to differentially pro-
vide upload resources to peers that reciprocate [6]. Still BitTorrent
is not without its faults; e.g., users have incentive to intelligentlyunder-reportwhatpiecesoftheﬁletheyhavetotheirneighbors[21]
and the bilateral exchanges of BitTorrent are inefﬁcient compared
with multilateral exchanges [2]. Thinking more broadly about dis-
tributed work systems, game theory has been employed in studying
the equilibrium properties of scrip systems that account for work
contributed and consumed by users [8]. While GWAP may be dif-
ferent from peer to peer systems, in that fun and enjoyment are
a large part of the success of GWAP, game-theoretic models can
still be adopted when coupled with appropriately modeled utility
functions. Moreover, human computation more broadly, in encom-
passing peer production and other systems, resembles the salient
aspects of P2P ﬁle sharing problems in regard to opportunity for
free-riding and the need to promote user contribution.
2. EXISTINGGAME-THEORETICMODELS
In what we believe to be the ﬁrst work to consider game theory
in GWAP, Ho et al. [11] develop and study the PhotoSlap game,
a game for semantic annotation of images and provide a game-
theoretic analysis of their game. PhotoSlap is based on the card
game Snap, and the goal is to have players “slap” on two consec-
utive images that contain the same object, location, or person and
not slap otherwise. They show that the target strategy is a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium, meaning that the outcome is obtained
in equilibrium for a particular model of user utility functions. In
a more recent paper, Ho and Chen [12] seek to identify general
themes across GWAP. They point out that many of the games in-
volve either simultaneous veriﬁcation, such as the ESP game, or
sequential veriﬁcation, such as Peekaboom. The equilibria in the
simultaneous veriﬁcation game are established by modeling these
games as coordination games, while these authors adopt the reﬁne-
ment of sequential equilibrium [17] in studying the equilibrium be-
havior in sequential veriﬁcation games. A simple equilibrium anal-
ysis can reveal qualitative differences about the distribution on tags
provided by users.
In considering the ESP game, Jain and Parkes [16] propose a
model within which one can seek to understand whether partici-
pants will coordinate on “easy” words associated with an image
and also propose to perturb the design in order to push the equilib-
rium towards “hard” words. Easy words model generic words that
could apply to large percentage of images that are in fact quite dif-
ferent. Such easy words could include colors. Hard words model
specialized words that more accurately describe an image. For ex-
ample, if we had an image of a red Ferrari, perhaps “red” and “car”
would be easy words and “Ferrari” would be a hard word. The ESP
game is modeled as a game of incomplete information in which a
player makes two decisions. The ﬁrst decision is to pick an “effort
level,” which dictates the domain from which a player will sample
words for the image. Each image is associated with a universe of
words, each of which has an associated probability (or frequency)
to capture the likelihood at which a large population of individuals
would output a particular word for the image, if they were asked
to output only one word. If a user picks “low effort,” she samples
her dictionary from a small subset of the universe consisting of the
most frequent words. If a user picks “medium effort,” she samples
her dictionary from a larger subset of the universe and ﬁnally, if a
user picks “high effort,” she samples her dictionary from the entire
universe. Having privately chosen an effort level and sampled a
dictionary of words, each player then picks a sequence with which
to report the words.
A lexicographic utility model of match-early preferences cap-
tures the fact that each player ﬁrst prefers to match rather than not,
and then prefers to match earlier rather than later. It is shown that
playing low effort and revealing words in order of decreasing fre-
quency is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the ESP game for any
distribution of word frequencies over the universe. This low-effort
equilibrium is in agreement with the experimental results of We-
ber et al. [31], who document a tendency for players to provide
labels that are colors, synonyms or generic words.
1 An impor-
tant question in the area of incentive design for the ESP game is
how to design incentives to elicit high effort from players and as
a result, richer, more descriptive labels. For example, Jain and
Parkes [16] consider an alternate model of rare-words ﬁrst prefer-
ences, in which the utility function of a player incorporates the fact
that she prefers to match rather than not match, and then match on
rare words before more frequent words, and only then break ties in
favor of matching sooner rather than later.
2 Under this preference
model, it is no longer the case that playing low effort is always a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. It becomes possible for high effort in
conjunction with playing words in order of increasing frequency to
be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Ina similar line of work, Jain et al. [15] propose a game-theoretic
model for Yahoo! Answers and examine the equilibrium under the
current scoring rule and under alternate scoring rules. Anyone
can post a question in Yahoo! Answers, and anyone can answer
a question. No money is exchanged for information provided, yet
Yahoo! Answers elicits useful work. Each user starts out with a
ﬁxed number of points and loses points for asking questions while
gaining points for answering questions. The system adopts a best-
answer scoring rule: while every user receives two points for an-
sweringaquestion, theanswerthatisselectedasa“bestanswer”by
the asker receives ten points. In the proposed model, a ﬁxed set of
answerers each have a unique piece of information corresponding
to a particular question. The strategic problem facing the answer-
ers is to decide when to report their information, and the asker is
modeled as satisﬁcing, with a value threshold beyond which she
will close the event and assign credit to the best answer (break-
ing ties at random). In the model, information aggregates as it is
posted, with previous answers folded into later ones. The model
seeks to capture the response to factual questions (e.g., “What are
the causes of the economic crisis we are currently facing?”) rather
than discussion questions [10] (e.g., “What is your favorite movie
of all time?”), with the former more likely to induce this kind of
information aggregation behavior. Pieces of information may be
complements, with each successive piece of information is worth
more than previous pieces of information, or substitutes, with each
successive piece of information is worth less than previous pieces
of information. Under the best-answer scoring rule, the socially-
optimal outcome in which all information is revealed immediately
is achieved as the unique equilibrium for substitutes information,
while the maximally suboptimal outcome in which all information
is reported in the last round is the unique equilibrium for the com-
plements case.
Considering this inefﬁciency, these authors then consider the ef-
fect of alternate scoring rules: an approval voting rule, where the
asker can choose up to k > 1 answers that she likes and reward
each of the k answerers equally, and a proportional-share rule
where the asker distributes the points among the answerers. In
1Theyalsoﬁndthatasoftbottrainedonthelanguagemodellearned
from the set of ESP game labels can agree with a human player
on 81% of the images that have at least one Taboo word without
lookingattheimage. Thisprovidesfairlystrongevidencethatusers
are coordinating on easy words that can be used to describe a large
set of images.
2We can think of the Taboo words in the ESP game as implement-
ingastepfunctionversionof rare-wordsﬁrstpreferences, inthatall
words that are not Taboo are rewarded equally if matched upon, yet
no points are awarded if both players enter the same Taboo word.the proportional-share rule, each answerer receives credit for the
marginal value she contributes to the system, which depends on
the time period in which she participates and how many answerers
that have gone before her. Both rules are able to achieve the most
efﬁcient outcome in equilibrium for the complements case under
certain restrictions on the valuation function of the asker and retain
the most efﬁcient outcome for the substitutes case, while differing
in terms of whether they also introduce an inefﬁcient equilibrium
for the substitutes case.
3. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
We see from existing work that it is possible to formalize
someaspects of humancomputation systemswithin game-theoretic
frameworks, and understand possible effects of changes in design
on the equilibrium behavior within the conﬁnes of a model. In this
section, we survey some future research directions in expanding the
role of game-theoretic analysis in the design and understanding of
human computation systems.
A Theory of Design for Human Computation. Mechanism de-
sign theory formalizes the idea of designing a game to promote
good outcomes in a game-theoretic equilibrium [13]. The problem
of mechanism design is to elicit private information (e.g., about
preferences and capabilities) in order to make a decision about how
to pick an alternative (e.g., an allocation of tasks or resources) to
promote a set of desiderata. Canonical examples of mechanisms
are voting protocols or auction protocols. Mechanism design poses
an ambitious question: what is the protocol design, across all pos-
sible protocols, that will optimally meet a set of desiderata? By ap-
pealing to the “revelation principle,” this problem is solved through
a focus on direct revelation mechanisms in which design is lim-
ited without loss of generality to simple, one-shot games in which
agents make a direct claim about their private information.
But the design challenges in GWAP and peer production are
quite different from those of mechanism design theory. Rather than
eliciting private information from participants, the challenge faced
in the design of such systems is to elicit private actions (or work)
from agents. Were the center able to make agents take particular ac-
tions, then human computation would reduce to a (still interesting)
question of design to promote efﬁcient, coordinated work. It seems
unlikely that a revelation principle will exist for human computa-
tion systems because the “details” of the design clearly matter. The
problem is more closely related to problems of agency and moral-
hazard from microeconomic theory than mechanism design [4, 18].
For example, in human computation the effort that a user exerts
in performing work is typically unobservable. The problem is re-
latedalsototheproblemofenvironmentdesign, inwhichadesigner
seeks to perturb user environments in order to induce useful behav-
iors (and perhaps this requires understanding a user’s underlying
preferences) [33, 34].
It is interesting, then, to seek a theory for the design of game
forms in which the equilibrium will elicit socially-efﬁcient actions
from users. The goal is likely not one of de novo design, but rather
design from some existing space of possible game forms.
Open Question 1. Can we agree on a design objective and pa-
rameterize the design space for particular problems of human com-
putation, in order to enable a game-theoretic analysis that identi-
ﬁes the design that induces optimal behavior in equilibrium?
Part of the challenge, of course, will be to formalize the design
space. One useful step in this direction is provided by a recent tax-
onomy for GWAP into three categories: output-agreement games,
inversion-problem games, and input-agreement games [27]. In
output-agreement games, such as the ESP Game, players are given
the same input and an individual round ends when both players
have produced the same output. In inversion-problem games, such
as Peekaboom, Phetch, and Verbosity, one player (the describer)
is given a secret object and must reveal information about it to a
second player (the guesser). The round ends when the guesser ac-
curately guesses the secret object. In input-agreement games, such
as TagATune, players are given inputs that are either the same or
different. Players describe their inputs to each other and must de-
cide whether they have the same input or not.
3 One concrete next
step would be to couple a game-theoretic model with each of these
three abstract game paradigms.
Altruism, Fun and Other-Regarding Preferences. Existing
game-theoretic models for human computation have assumed that
all agents participating in the system have selﬁsh motivations.
But there is evidence that users are behaving altruistically in
peer-production systems such as Wikipedia, Yahoo! Answers, and
YouTube [23]. In fact, game-theoretic analysis is not constrained
to selﬁsh utility functions, and it will be useful to expand our mod-
els of what motivates users. For example, altruism can naturally be
incorporated within the selﬁsh actor model by introducing other-
regardingpreferences[5]orinequality-averseutilityfunctions[24].
To make a meaningful advance in this direction does present a chal-
lenge, however, in terms of identifying the right model of users in
this larger space. A related challenge is to develop an understand-
ing of what kinds of cognitive activities are enjoyable for users,
and to take this into account during design. For example, can the
lessons from existing GWAP design such as TagATune be general-
ized to understand the kinds of tasks that are inherently enjoyable?
Open Question 2. How can altruism be best incorporated into
game-theoretic models of human computation? Can we under-
stand the role of altruistic preferences within a theory of design
and change designs in accordance with the prevalence of other-
regarding preferences? How sensitive are the socially-efﬁcient
equilibrium to the number of altruistic users? Can formal mod-
els be developed to predict the amount of fun that users will receive
from cognitive activities?
Another known issue in the design of human cooperation sys-
tems is that of “crowding out” of altruistic behaviors. For example,
one famous example is that when one country moved from vol-
untary blood donations to small monetary incentives for donating
blood, the donation rates went down instead of up [7]. This kind of
interaction between motivations seems challenging to model; when
does a positive reinforcement in one domain become a negative re-
inforcement in another domain? There is also plenty of evidence
from behavioral economics about the inﬂuence of contextual fac-
tors on user decision-making [20].
The Macro-Level Design Problem. Existing work in game-
theoretic modeling for human computation has focused on model-
ing a single-interaction between a ﬁxed set of users; e.g., one ESP
game, or a particular question in Yahoo! Answers. But in prac-
tice, these are typically complex dynamic systems, in which users
participate multiple times (often with different sets of players) and
in which previous experiences can inﬂuence future behavior. One
aspect of game-theoretic modeling of the larger ecosystem will in-
volve adopting the framework of population games. The theory
of population games is suitable for systems of large numbers of
3The problem of tagging images was unsuccessfully implemented
as an output-agreement game, yet ingeniously solved as an input-
agreement game [19]. This shows the importance of being able to
quantify fun in human computation systems and the value of being
able to predict the amount of fun that users will receive.agents, where agents interact anonymously and each agent’s pay-
offs depends on the distribution over opponents’ choices. Individ-
ual agents in the population are “small”; any single agent has little
effect on any other agents’ payoffs [25]. The goal of such modeling
would be to examine the effects of such macro-level design issues
as how to match players so that desirable behaviors (from a system-
wide perspective) propagate through the population. This agenda
can also borrow from the extensive literature of diffusion over so-
cial networks in the computer science and economics literature [14,
22]. Another interesting aspect of the macro-level problem is the
problem of coordination, where the productive resources in a sys-
tem are best coordinated to solve a global problem.
Open Question 3. By adopting a macro-level, population-wide
view of human computation systems, can we understand how to
design information ﬂows, matching and coordination algorithms
to promote both the propagation of beneﬁcial behaviors through a
user society and a more efﬁcient (e.g. coordinated) use and reuse
of human resources?
For example, in question and answer forums, perhaps a macro-
level model should capture the observed behavior of some answer-
ers in strategically choosing which questions to answer based on
the amount of money or points promised to the winner [32, 23]
or the number of other users that have already participated in the
thread [32]. Are there some fraction of answerers who carefully
select the question they answer to improve their best-answer per-
centage (which is displayed prominently in their proﬁle)? How can
we get these answerers to reveal relevant information, whenever
they have it, rather than hand-picking the question they answer to
attain “best-answer” status?
4. CONCLUSIONS
Looking ahead, there are a number of exciting directions for fu-
ture work examining the role of game theory in formalizing the
design of human computation systems, where incentives are a ﬁrst-
order consideration. This work should be informed by empiri-
cal evidence as much as possible. Indeed, the abundance of data
presents one of the most compelling reasons to continue to pursue
such an agenda because broader advances could also be made in
folding models of human behavior back into game theory.
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